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TRIAL WITHOUT JURY.'
THE JUDICIAL CHARACTER.
The judges may find it an easier duty to try cqscs uniembarrassed
by juries; but they will, we think, feel it to be a nobler function
with which they may now find themselves invested, that of forming
and giving expression to their own judgments instead of acting as
the assistants of other men. Hitherto their duty has been to state,
as clearly as might be, the questions to be decided, and to direct
and assist, by what is called a careful summing up, twelve men,
whose minds may be already possessed by prejudice, or puzzled by
the sophistry, or disturbed by the clamor, or led astray by the elo-
quenco of opposing counsel. Some judges, also, with more or less
skill and success, and more or less consistently with their duty, have
had the habit of making attempts to lead juries to right verdicts,
2 By the English Common Law Procedure Act of 1854, the Judges of the Su-
perior Courts of Common Law are enabled to try, with the consent of the partiea,
questions of fact without the intervention of a jury. This radical change in the
law has attracted much professional attention, and we give our readers tho article
presented by the Law .agazae for February, 1855.
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or to what the judges have deemed right verdicts. There were per-
sons who thought that occasionally the summings up of Lord Abin-
ger bad too much the character of pleadings in favor of the side
which he considered entitled to the verdict. In the former part of
his life at the bar, he had a certain way of his own of telling the
jury what their verdict ought to be, so as to leave them scarcely the
power of deliberation. This command over juries was more appro-
priate to the bench, and was frequently, in the case of Lord Abin-
ger, irresistible. We remember a trial at which he presided at
Stafford, in which, in the course of his summing up, he explained
and illustrated the paradox: the greater the truth, the greater the
libel. He put the case 6f a woman who, having erred in her youth,
had after.wards, when residing in another part of the country, mar-
ried a respectable man, and had become the mother of a family;
and he supposed a person, knowing the events of the earlier part of
her life, to disclose them for the purpose of annoying her husband,
or herself, or her family. The way in which he put the case we
cannot attempt to relate. In his quiet tone, Lord Abinger asked,
if in such a case the saying would not be true: the greater the
truth, the greater the libel. He told them to ask their own hearts
for answer. We well remember the answer our own feelings gave;
and we could plainly perceive the effect of the question on the minds
of the jury; and we now refer to it, not for the purpose of illus-
trating a paradox, but for the purpose of illustrating the sort of
power one of the most successful of modern pleaders, carrying his
skill to the bench, exercised over the minds of others.
Lord Ellenborough commanded juries by look and tone. His
personal dignity was in itself a power and a strength; but it did
not always prevail. The London juries came latterly to resist his
charges, as too dictatorial. There have been other instances of the
jealousy of juries of habitual attempts by judges to lead them or
command them.
Lord Tenterden was more successful, by reason of his lucid state-
ment of the facts, and of the law applicable to them. He seemed
to travel with the jury along the right path to justice.
Lord Denman was a striking instance of the power which one
man can exercise over other men, when he combines in his one per-
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son the scholar, the lawyer, the magistrate, the gentleman. With-
out art, certainly without the appearance-6f art, he won the confi-
dence of juries. English lawyers may be proud'of Lord Denman.
We sometimes hear praised the careful Summing up of a pains-
taking judge. - But how often is a summing up too minutely care-
ful, setting the facts and the combinations of the facts in every
possible light, going over them again and again, and distinguishing
slight shades from still slighter shades, until every juryman and
every listener is in a state of bewilderment, from which it is hope-
less that the jury can recover, with their faculties in a state fit for
deliberation. Many of our readers are not old enough to have
heard Mr. Justice Littledale sum up, in this manner, circumstantial
evidence; and some of his successors have had the same fault. Un-
fortunately, too, this fault, or weakness, or want of skill, is more
frequently shown in the most important trials, those of which the
result affects the life of the accused,-trials for-murder. The im-
portance of the trial very properly makes the judge as careful as
it is in his power to be; but it unfortunately happens that the more
care a judge of this character takes, the more inefficient he be-
comes.
To return to our pubject. It remains t6 be seen whether
it will be the practice of parties to consent to dispense with
juries. This we consider at least doubtful. When there is
a difference between two parties, one may be in the right,
and the other in the wrong; but it often happens that both are
in the wrong, one being more wrong than the other. The one in
the right, or least in the wrong, needs a remedy. He is the most
likely of the two to go to law, and he is the most likely to desire
that sort of trial which is the most likely to bring the truth to light.
He would most likely prefer the judgment of a single judge, a lawyer
accustomed to sift and weigh evidence, to the verdict of twelve men
taken by lot from the very miscellaneous classes of persons of whose
names the jury lists consist. On the contrary, the party in the
wrong, or least in the right, is interested in withholding a r 'medy.
He is not. the one to commence proceedings; and if proceedings
are taken-against him, he would most likely prefer the chance of a
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verdict of a jury in his favor, to the probability of the judgment of
a single judge against him. He is not likely to give his consent to
a trial without a jury.
What has happened in the County Courts may serve to illustrate
what we mean. In the case of a difference not within the ordinary.
jurisdiction of the County Courts,-for instance, a dispute involving
a question as to the title to land,-the-:parties in difference may, by
consent, give a County Court jurisdiction between them, and thus
avoid the delay and expense of a trial at the assizes. Consents of
this sort are so rarely given, that the law giving effect to'them is
almost a dead letter; and inquiries have been made as to the -cause
of this. Some have suggested the reason to be the interest which
the lawyers, by whom the parties in- difference are advised, have in
preferring the more expensive remedy; but we have formed an
opinion that the true cause is the natural disinclination of a wrong-
doer to facilitate a remedy for the wrong he has inflicted, and his
natural disinclination to do that which may lead to his being com-
pelled to make restitution. He cannot be expected to consent to a
cheap remedy. He is more likely to hope that his opponent will,
for want of means, be unable to proceed to trial at the assizes,
involving, among other great expenses, themaintenance of witnesses
for days at an assize town. Universal experience tells us that the
game -of the wrongdoer is, by delay and increase of expense, to
wear out the means and hopes of the person whom he has wronged.
We are inclined to think the better way would be to permit any
sort of action to be brought in a County Court at the option of the
plaintiff, giving the defendant an equal option to remove into a
superior court any cause involving a question not now within the
ordinary jurisdiction of the County Court. A person who would
refuse an express consent to an action being brought against him,
might, nevertheless, not care to take the trouble- and incur the
expense of removing it when actuaily brought. Here, again, what
we mean is illustrated by what has happened in the County Courts.
In any of those Courts any cause is, as a matter of course, tried by
the judge without a jury, unless in some cases either party requires
a jury. It is very rarely that a jury is required. Things take
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their course. So we think it would be better in the Superior Courts
if, instead of the dispensing with a jury being made dependent on
the concurrence of two parties already in difference, the recourse
to a jury were made dependent on its being expressly required by
one of them. -"
N~evertheless, upon the probable supposition that there will be
some trials ii the Superior Courts of Common Law without juries,
we propose to discuss the new functions with which the judges are
now invested. Henceforth, instead of having, in all trials of
questions of fact, to.perform the embarrassing duty of assisting
others to do what they could do better alone, they will sometimes
find themselves in a position in which their function will be to
1lsten carefully to the evidence, to sift, and compare, and weigh it
calmly, to form their impartial conclusions, and to express them
clearly, satisfying their own consciences, instead of endeavoring,
often -vainly, to giye a right direction to the consciences of twelve
other persons, and making attempts to lead them to a right con-
clusion.
We will now consider, as forming, it will be seen, a part of our
present subject, some of the means of detecting truth when hidden
in a mass of conflicting.evidence. This .is morj likely to be effected,
now that the interested parties may be heard, than when their evi-
dence was rejected. Those who really know the truth, are now
permitted, or if they hold back, may be required to give evidence.
In a trial of a question of fact, the truth may generally be said to
be present in court, known to one or more persons who conceal it:
the object is to bring it to light. Of the various tests of truth,
with which the experience of lawyers have made them long
familiar, we do not propose to speak. We intend to confine our
remarks to those tests only which have become useful by reason of
the evidence of interested parties being made admissible.
It sometimes happens that, when two persons, both interested,
and both from their character or from circumstances equally un-
worthy of credit, contradict each other in their evidence, the truth,
or the probable truth, may be elicited from their statements, by
the process of comparing admissions inadvertently made by one
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against. his interests, with admissions inadvertently made .by the
other against his interest. Sometimes,- too; admissions against
apparent interest are not inadvertent,- and are mixed up with false
statements for the purpose of giving -them a show- of 'candor, or a
tinge of honesty. Admissions often supply a clue which may lead
to the discovery of the truth, and they are sometimes elicited from
a party by effective cross-examination, or by a concluding exami-
nation by the judge himself, acting on materials elicited -by the
counsel in their examination of the parties or witnesses. -
Points of this sort have always been of especial' importance in
the County Courts, in which, from their first establishment, the
parties interested have been examined as witnesses. They become
more important, because availabie in a more, important judicial
sphere, from the time a change of the law rendered the evidence of
interested parties admissible in the Superior Courts.
In the County Courts, too, these points were, from the first, of
great importance, because questions of fact have always in those
courts been generally decided by the judges, the -parties geldom
having recourse to juries. A judge who can, with sufficient. skill,
collate admissions made by interested parties, each against himself,
so as to arrive at the tuth, or probable truth, might find it difficult
to suggest, much more to explain to a jury such a course of reason-
ing, and impossible to direct them, or even give them effectual
assistance in the application of it to. the questions under investiga-
tion. As it 'may be thought that some of the judges of the County
Courts have derived from their past experience, so it may be con-
sidered certain that the judges of the Superior Courts will derive
from their future experience, powers of analyzing 'evidence, the
greater from their minds not being disturbed in the application of
the appropriate tests, by the necessity of finding words by means
of which to express to juries the difficult points to be considered.
It may be hoped that some of our judges may now have an oppor-
tunity of becoming, in the history of their profession, the rivals of
Sir William Scott, the great master of the art of discovering truth
through the veil of falsehood.
If we might venture a suggestion to the learned persons for whom
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we are now contemplating a new sphere of utility and fame, we
would suggest the necessity for curbing any feelings of impatience,
leading to too early an expression of the effect which is being made
by evidence on the mind, From this fault, juries have been usually
free, by reason of their'habitually passive demeanor. It is a fault
to which an active-minded judge may be found very liable, unless
he is most careful to avoid it. The more immediate bad effect of
impatience or hastiness on the part of a judge may be that, at an
early part of the trial, parties or witnesses may be exposed to cen-
sure, which further investigation or reflection may show them not
to deserve. The more real bad effect is the embarrassment pro-
duced on the mind of the judge himself, if, before having heard
all the evidence, he makes known the impression made on him by
a part of it. A judge, who too soon makes known what is passing
in his mind, may not only raise on the one side hopes, and on the
other side fears, either of which may needlessly embarrass the
party subject to them in the conduct of the cause, but may
impose on himself the embarrassing necessity, firstly, of recti-
fying expressed opinions, and, secondly, of finding terms by
means of which fitly to express the change which his opinions
undergo. It is an undignified position for h judge to find him-
self obliged to unsay what he has spoken from the bench, and
injurious to his reputation to be often obliged to do so; but,
moreover, the thing itself is so difficult to do well as materially
to impair the efficiency of a judge in the particular cause in which
it becomes necessary. The process is hardly consistent with the
calmness necessary for the right conduct of a judicial inquiry. The
last act of the trial, the delivery of the judgment, when all the
proofs and arguments have been heard and considered, is, generally
- speaking, the earliest period at which a judge can safely give utte-
rance to his opinions or his feelings, and then, so far as is right for
the purpose of making known the grounds of his judgment, his
place is plainly and fearlessly to declare his opinions and his feel-
ings. We do not say that exceptions will not occur to the rule we
are insisting on, that a judge must carefully guard himself against
every disposition to impatience. Roguish claims are sometimes
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made, and roguish defences are sometimes attempted, which cannot
be expected to receive from a man of right feeling any other re-
gard than that of scorn, or any other treatment than that of being
summarily crushed. Cases of this sort happen from time to time,
but they are comparatively of rare occurrence, and the safest course
for a judge is to be slow to perceive them. It is a fatal error to be
too ready to stop causes. Injustice, or the sense of injustice, thus
caused, may be irreparable. On the other hand, a cause stopped on
safe grounds is an excellent precedent, deterring other suitors from
attempts to practise imposition on courts of justice.
It will be perceived that we anticipate great advantages to the
judicial character from the practice, if it should prevail, of dispen-
sing with juries. We are also sanguine enough to hope for still
greater advantages to the character of the English advocate. Soph-
istry, passion apart from reason, rhetoric without logic, will no
longer be effective weapons. Flkiency, verbiage, iteration, will be
valueless. Clamor, and abuse of parties and witnesses, and perso-
nal display, will not serve as substiutes for argument. Those men
who, now at the Bar, adorn their profession by their real eloquence,
their skill in argument, by their appeals to the feelings, when the
feelings are fairly interested, by language deriving real strength
from its gravity and moderation, will meet with more ample rewards
and honors, and will find many imitators. Then will be felt the
truth of the principle, too often unheeded, that the advocate is
properly the assistant of the judge, bound to say all that he can
fairly say for the party for whom he is retained, but not justified
in attempting to mislead the Court or jury by the distortion of
facts, or by any artifice inconsistent with a regard for truth. Those
persons who, in the struggle for success, have hitherto sometimes
more or less habitually yielded to the temptation to say thit for
their clients which a man would not, consistently with honesty, say
for himself, will, when addressing a single judge trying questions
of fact, find that such practices must be given up, as unavailing in
each particular case, and as destructive of the character of the ad-
vocates who have recourse to them. We feel assured, not without
some experience to warrant the assertion, that an advocate, properly
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qualified for his office, will find "his services useful to his clients, in
proportion to the candor with which, urging all that may be fairly
urged, he abstains from addressing to the Court arguments tainted
with.falsehood. It is no fanciful contrast to draw, that on the one
side of the high-minded pleader of causes, the advocate, in the true
sense of the word, who, scorning unworthy artifice, renders good ser-
vice in the administration of justice; and, on the other side, of
the mere hireling, who, with no other object than that of obtaining
verdicts, whether .rightly or wrongly, habitually distorts the facts,
and is an unworthy disturber of what, but for him, might be the
pure stream of justice. We believe that the first class is, in'these
times, becoming more numerous, the latter class more rare. We
firmly believe that the more frequent trials of questions of fact by
dxperienced judges, instead of inexperienced jurymen' become, the
sooner will the class of unworthy hirelings vanish from our tribu-
nals, and the sooner shall we see realized the theqry, that the advo-
cate is an assistant. judge. Nied we dilate on the consequent ad-
vantages to the judge, to the litigants, and to the community?
We-have yet one suggestion t6 make to the learned judges; the
importance of a summing up, a statement of the grounds of each
decision. We have reason to believe that the suitors will be better
satisfied, if a judge, who, deciding questions of fact, will state the
grounds of his decision, than if he pronounces a bare "Judgment
for the plaintiff," or "Judgment for the defendant," like the ver-
dict of a jury, for the plaintiff, or for the defendant. But we should
not have adverted to this point, were it not that we have still
greater reason for believing that the losing party likes to know why
he loses, and is pleased if he can gather from the judgment, that
all facts- and arguments, making apparently in his favor, have re-
ceived due consideration. But this, and similar points, occupy
doubtless the thoughts of those who have now cast on them a new
class of duties. To the discharge of those duties they will bring
those qualities which make them worthy of their high position, ren-
dered still higher and more useful by their becoming now, more
than ever, the real arbiters of questions and disputes arising among
the inhabitants of this great country. J. F.
